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Gibraltar 
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“[W]hen the experts panic, they call the fire department.” 
 -Harvey Eisner, FDNY1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The idea of the emergency responder is deeply rooted in American 
culture.2  As shown in the prevalence of emergency responders in 
popular culture, the American cultural consciousness of emergency 
responders runs so deep that it has been called a modern re-cast of a 
classical archetype, typifying the “American Hero.”3  But what is not 
well known is that just over 800,000 (70%) of the more than 1.1 million 
firefighters4 and 49% of the 826,111 credentialed emergency medical 
responders at the EMT-Basic level are volunteers.5 
These volunteers are critical to our communities.  However, recent 
court decisions threaten the stability of the volunteer fire departments 
that they work for.  In Mendel v. City of Gibraltar, the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that because volunteer firefighters were paid an 
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 1.   Harvey Eisner, Editorial: The Smoke is Clearing . . ., FIREHOUSE (June 1, 2002), 
http://www.firehouse.com/news/10545325/editorial-the-smoke-is-clearing. 
 2.   See generally SUSAN J. ELLIS & KATHERINE H. CAMPBELL, BY THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY 
OF AMERICANS AS VOLUNTEERS (1st ed. 1978). 
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 5.   GREG MEARS ET AL., FED. INTERAGENCY COMM. FOR EMERGENCY MED. SERVS., 2011 
NATIONAL EMS ASSESSMENT 89, 106 (2012), https://www.ems.gov/pdf/2011/National_EMS_ 
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hourly wage while responding to emergencies, they were not 
“volunteers” under the Fair Labor Standards Act (the “FLSA”) and thus 
potentially owed wages for time spent in furtherance of their 
department.6  The few cases involving volunteer emergency responders 
since Mendel have cited to it favorably,7 leading many observers to 
caution that providing benefits to volunteer emergency responders could 
re-classify them as employees, triggering fears of potential liability for 
volunteer departments across America.8 
This is a dangerous precedent.  Volunteerism rates in the emergency 
services have dropped steadily, with the number of volunteer firefighters 
per 100,000 Americans declining 28% from 1984 to 2003.9  In response, 
departments around the country have proposed or provided more 
incentives to gain and retain volunteer responders, such as tax breaks,10 
reduced utility bills,11 and retirement fund contributions,12 along with tax 
credits and online classes.13  The more these benefits increase, the more a 
position as a volunteer responder looks like standard employment to 
courts interpreting the FLSA.  And the effect of transforming a volunteer 
                                                        
 6.   Mendel v. City of Gibraltar, 727 F.3d 565, 572 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 7.   See Martinez v. Ehrenberg Fire Dist., No. CV-14-00299-PHX-DGC, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 73832, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 8, 2015); Borough of Emmaus v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 156 
A.3d 384, 392 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017). 
 8.   See, e.g., STACY E. CRABTREE, HEYL, ROYSTER, VOELKER & ALLEN, LIABILITY OF 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO VOLUNTEERS FOR WAGES AND INJURIES B-5 (2015), 
http://www.heylroyster.com/_data/files/Seminar%202015/Heyl%20Royster%20Fall%202015%20Cl
aims%20Handling%20Seminar%20Materials%20-%20Section%20B.pdf; Phyllis Katz, Caution: 
Payments to Volunteers Can Lead to Trouble, VA. LOCALITY L. (Jan. 15, 2014), 
http://valocalitylaw.com/2014/01/15/caution-payments-to-volunteers-can-lead-to-trouble/; Certain 
Volunteers May Be Employees Under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Family Medical Leave Act, 
MIKA MEYERS PLC (Dec. 10, 2013), https://www.mikameyers.com/news/article/certain-volunteers-
may-be-employees-under-the-fair-labor-standards-act-and-family-medical-leave-act. 
 9.   SUSAN A. CHAPMAN ET AL., EMS WORKFORCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: A NATIONAL 
ASSESSMENT 60 (2008), https://www.ems.gov/pdf/research/Studies-and-Reports/National_ 
Workforce_Assessment.pdf. 
 10.   John Rather, Emergency Workers Will Get Tax Breaks, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/29/nyregion/emergency-workers-will-get-tax- breaks.html?mcubz 
=3. 
 11.   H.B. 698, 201st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017), http://www.legis.state.pa.us/ 
CFDOCS/Legis/PN/Public/btCheck.cfm?txtType=PDF&sessYr=2017&sessInd=0&billBody=H&bil
lTyp=B&billNbr=0698&pn=0749; see also Greg Barton, Measure Help Pay Basic Utilities for 
Volunteer Fire Companies, WDAC (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.wdac.com/2017/03/06/measure-
help-pay-basic-utilities-for-volunteer-fire-companies/. 
 12.   Incentives for Volunteers, ROCKWALL FIRE DEP’T, http://www.rockwall.com/documents/ 
fire/VolunteerIncentives.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2018). 
 13.   Tyler Langan, Low Pay Creates ‘Revolving Door’ for Firefighters in Lake Country, J. 
SENTINEL, http://www.jsonline.com/story/communities/lake-country/news/2017/08/29/low-pay-
creates-revolving-door-firefighters-lake-country/581102001/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2018). 
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department to a full-time department can cause significant increases in 
property taxes.  One study of New York counties found that on average, 
transitioning away from a volunteer department would require raising 
property taxes by 26.5%, with some communities requiring property tax 
increases of over 70%.14 
This need not be the case.  Because the fundamental purpose of 
volunteer emergency services is to provide critical care to their 
community members and not to make a living, courts have 
misinterpreted various provisions of the FLSA to apply to volunteer 
emergency services technicians.  To remedy these misinterpretations, 
courts should recognize the congressional intent of the FLSA exceptions 
to public agency volunteers and follow the Department of Labor’s (the 
“DOL”) guidance on how to classify these workers.  Specifically, courts 
should adopt the DOL’s recommended standard that workers are not 
receiving significant remuneration if they receive less than 20% of the 
pay of their full-time counterparts.  Courts should also apply this 20% 
test to the annual wage of the worker instead of engaging in an hourly 
wage analysis. 
Section II of this Comment will discuss the history and development 
of the volunteer emergency services.  Section III will discuss the history 
and development of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as well as various 
judicially created tests used to interpret and apply the FLSA to 
volunteers.  Section IV will overview Mendel v. City of Gibraltar and its 
potential impact on volunteer services, and Section V will present the 
proper test courts should use to make the analysis of whether these 
workers are “employees” under the FLSA. 
II. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE EMERGENCY SERVICES 
The history of volunteer emergency services is fundamental to 
understanding why courts like the one in Mendel misunderstand the 
nature of this American tradition.  Volunteer emergency responders—
both firefighters and emergency medical services technicians—make up 
most of the emergency responders in the United States.15  These services 
provide the same quality of care as full-time responders and do so for a 
                                                        
 14.   FIREMEN’S ASS’N OF THE STATE OF N.Y., TAX SAVINGS AND ECONOMIC VALUE OF 
VOLUNTEER FIREFIGHTERS IN NEW YORK 3 (2015) [N.Y. REPORT], http://www.fasny.com/pdfs/ 
VFEconomicImpactStudy.pdf. 
 15.   See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
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fraction of the cost—and they’ve provided these services for as long as 
these services have existed.16 
A. History of Firefighting 
The history of volunteer emergency services is the history of all 
emergency services.  The first emergency services in America were 
volunteer firefighting companies.17  In 1648, after a major fire swept 
through the city, Governor Peter Stuyvesant of New Amsterdam (now 
the state of New York) appointed four men to act as volunteer fire 
wardens, whose job was to inspect chimneys for signs of neglect.18  He 
also appointed citizens to the “Rattle Watch,” or volunteer teams that 
patrolled the streets at night carrying large wooden rattles, spinning the 
rattles if a fire was seen.19  If a rattle was spun, the community knew to 
form “bucket brigades,” or lines of people from a source of water to the 
fire to expedite the process of getting buckets of water to the fire.20 
The first municipal fire departments in America were also volunteer 
departments.  In 1678, Boston appointed thirteen men and constructed a 
fire engine—a wooden sled with a hand-powered pump—to respond to 
fires throughout the city.21  These men were only paid per call to service, 
and kept other careers.22  However, in 1711 a massive fire swept through 
the town, destroying over 100 buildings.23 
The answer to addressing the growing risk of fire outbreaks in 
colonial America without inflating taxes was increased volunteerism.  
The Union Fire Company was founded in 1736 in Philadelphia by 
Benjamin Franklin,24 and set out written procedures for fire responses, 
included mandatory training regimens, and standardized gear, and 
                                                        
 16.   See infra notes 35–43 and accompanying text. 
 17.   DENNIS SMITH, DENNIS SMITH’S HISTORY OF FIREFIGHTING IN AMERICA: 300 YEARS OF 
COURAGE 11–12 (1978). 
 18.   Craig Collins, The Heritage and Evolution of America’s Volunteer Fire Service, in  
NATIONAL VOLUNTEER FIRE COUNCIL, A PROUD TRADITION: 275 YEARS OF THE AMERICAN 
VOLUNTEER FIRE SERVICE 10 (Chuck Oldham et al. eds., 2012), https://www.nvfc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/Anniversary_Publication.pdf. 
 19.   Id. 
 20.   Id. 
 21.   Id. at 10–11. 
 22.   Id. at 11–12. 
 23.   Id. at 11. 
 24.   JOYCE CHAPLIN, THE FIRST SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN: BENJAMIN FRANKLIN AND THE 
PURSUIT OF GENIUS 81 (2007). 
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equipment use.25  This volunteer organization was so successful that its 
model was widely copied and replicated.26  Because of the success of 
volunteer departments, full-time fire departments did not exist in 
America until 1853.27 
Even today, volunteer firefighting is the norm.  Just over 70% of all 
registered fire departments are volunteer departments.28  Of the nearly 
30,000 fire departments across America, only 2,651 do not use volunteer 
firefighters.29  Ninety-five percent of volunteer firefighters work in 
communities with a population smaller than 25,000.30 
This makes protecting the practice of volunteer firefighting critical.  
Any legal changes in how these organizations are classified or regulated 
has a phenomenal nationwide impact: over half of Americans live in 
communities with less than 25,000 residents.31  Volunteer firefighting 
rates are down across the nation, resulting in a 171% increase in local 
firefighting costs since 1980, adjusted for inflation.32  Additionally, these 
smaller communities have seen an increase in poverty since 2008,33 
likely resulting in a lower tax base for many communities.  Any changes 
that would remove volunteer firefighting services would need to be 
replaced with paid services—so any such changes would further stress 
these already strained small-community budgets.34 
                                                        
 25.   See Benjamin Franklin, Articles of the Union Fire Company, 7 December 1736, in 2 THE 
PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, JANUARY 1, 1735, THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1744, at 150–54 
(Leonard W. Labaree ed., 1961), reprinted, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE (Feb. 1, 2018), 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-02-02-0024. 
 26.   Jessica Choppin Roney, “Ready to Act in Defiance of Government”: Colonial 
Philadelphia Voluntary Culture and the Defense Association of 1747-1748, 8 EARLY AM. STUD. 
358, 365 (2010) (discussing the fire companies modeled after the Union Fire Company). 
 27.   See H.R. Res. 1419, 111th Cong. (2010) (celebrating the 100th anniversary of the Ohio 
Fire Chiefs’ Association and commending the Association on its century of service to the State of 
Ohio). 
 28.   National Fire Department Registry Quick Facts, U.S. FIRE ADMIN. [hereinafter National 
Fire Registry], https://apps.usfa.fema.gov/registry/summary (last updated Apr. 11, 2018). 
 29.   HAYNES & STEIN, supra note 4, at 22. 
 30.   Id. at 3. 
 31.   Wendell Cox, America is More Small Town than We Think, NEW GEOGRAPHY (Sept. 10, 
2008), http://www.newgeography.com/content/00242-america-more-small-town-we-think. 
 32.   JOHN R. HALL, JR., NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, THE TOTAL COST OF FIRE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 30 (2012), https://www.nfpa.org/-/media/Files/News-and-Research/Fire-statistics/Economic 
-impact/ostotalcost.pdf. 
 33.   Poverty Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.ers.usda.gov/ 
topics/rural-economy-population/rural-poverty-well-being/poverty-overview.aspx. 
 34.   See N.Y. REPORT, supra note 14, at 1–3. 
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B. History of the Emergency Medical Services 
The emergency medical services also began as volunteer endeavors.  
The first recognized American ambulance service began during the 
Revolutionary War.35  Responding to battlefield injuries, George 
Washington tasked his Hospital Department Director General to organize 
“flying hospitals” to accompany the colonial army.36  These “flying 
hospitals” utilized horse-drawn wagons and carriages to collect injured 
soldiers and provide emergency care while the soldiers were transported 
to a nearby triage center.37  This early form framework for ambulance 
services became the norm for the American military forces during the 
Civil War, but was not utilized in any civilian hospitals.38 
Commercial Hospital was the first civilian ambulance service—and 
it was also largely volunteer.39  Founded in Cincinnati in 1820, 
Commercial Hospital established its first general ambulance services for 
the public in 1865.  Commercial Hospital’s ambulance service responded 
to medical emergencies across the city, with ambulance drivers earning 
far below the amount needed to support themselves by that job alone: 
roughly $5,000 a year in 2018 dollars.40 
A few years later, Edward Dalton, a former United States army 
surgeon, founded an ambulance service at Bellevue Hospital in New 
York.41  Bellevue Hospital employed horse-drawn carriages with a 
moveable floor that could be used to receive and remove patients.42  
More importantly, the staff responding on these vehicles in some cases 
merely consisted of interns.43 
                                                        
 35.   VINCENT D. ROBBINS, A HISTORY OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES & MEDICAL 
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN AMERICA 8–9 (2005), https://www.monoc.org/bod/docs/history%20 
american%20ems-mts.pdf. 
 36.   Id. at 9–10. 
 37.   Id. 
 38.   Id. at 10–17. 
 39.   Id. at 17. 
 40.   Id. at 17 n.li (noting that the records indicate one driver in 1866 earned $360 annually); see 
also U.S. Inflation Rate, 1866-2018 ($360), IN2013DOLLARS.COM, http://www.in2013dollars.com/ 
1866-dollars-in-2018?amount=360 (last visited Apr. 8, 2018) (estimating $360 in 1866 to equal 
$5,392.27 in 2018). 
 41.   Morton Galdston, Ambulance Notes of a Bellevue Hospital Intern: May 1938, 76 J. URB. 
HEALTH 509, 510–11 (1999), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3456689/pdf/11524 
_2006_Article_BF02351507.pdf.  
 42.   Id. 
 43.   Id. 
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Hospital-run volunteer services such as these sprang up across the 
United States in the late 19th century, but there was no singular 
understanding of how agencies should respond to medical emergencies 
in the field.44  That would happen in 1966, when the “White Paper” was 
published.45 
The emergency medical services are still largely volunteer.  Of all 
emergency medical services professionals with EMT-Basic training in 
the United States, 49% are volunteer.46  One study by the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration found that 75% of the geography 
of America could be classified as “rural,” or far outside of urban zones—
and in those rural areas, 74% of the residents relied on volunteer 
emergency medical services.47  And these agencies are already fraught 
with staffing issues: some areas in 2008 reported their volunteer agencies 
were only fully staffed approximately 50% of the time.48  So any changes 
in the law that would negatively impact these volunteer emergency 
medical services would further strain agencies struggling to maintain the 
staffing necessary to respond to medical emergencies across 75% of the 
United States. 
C. History of the “White Paper” 
In 1966, the National Academy of Sciences published a report on 
preventable death in the United States.49  The report, titled “Accidental 
Death and Disability: The Neglected Disease of Modern Society,” later 
became known as the “White Paper.”50  In it, the researchers found that 
more Americans had died in car accidents than in the Korean War.51  
Most critically, it found that due to the lack professional standards in 
                                                        
 44.   KATHERINE BARKLEY, THE AMBULANCE: THE STORY OF EMERGENCY TRANSPORTATION 
OF SICK AND WOUNDED THROUGH THE CENTURIES 10–16 (1978). 
 45.   See infra Section II.C. 
 46.   MEARS ET AL., supra note 5, at 106. 
 47.   CHAPMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 21, 45. 
 48.   VICTORIA A. FREEMAN ET AL., ISSUES IN STAFFING EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES: 
RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY OF LOCAL RURAL AND URBAN EMS DIRECTORS, RURAL 
HEALTH RES. & POL’Y CTRS. 10 (2008), http://www.shepscenter.unc.edu/rural/pubs/report/ 
FR93.pdf. 
 49.   NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. ET AL., ACCIDENTAL DEATH AND DISABILITY: THE NEGLECTED 
DISEASE OF MODERN SOCIETY (1966) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER], https://www.nap.edu/read/ 
9978/chapter/1. 
 50.   Id. at 8; see also Dennis Edgerly, Birth of EMS: The History of the Paramedic, J. 
EMERGENCY MED. SERVS. (Oct. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Edgerly], http://www.jems.com/articles/print/ 
volume-38/issue-10/features/birth-ems-history-paramedic.html.  
 51.   WHITE PAPER, supra note 49, at 8. 
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prehospital care, “if seriously wounded . . . chances of survival would be 
better in the zone of combat than on the average city street.”52  
Ultimately, this report recommended the standardization of emergency 
medical training for “rescue squad personnel, policemen, firemen, and 
ambulance attendants.”53  This report criticized the lack of standards in 
all emergency response fields—including both full-time and volunteer 
agencies.54 
The recommendations of this paper led to the first nationally 
recognized curriculum for emergency medical care providers.55  Eight 
years later, the recommendations of the “White Paper” were formalized 
by the EMS Systems Act in 1973.56  This Act required communities to 
meet the national standards in prehospital care before receiving federal 
funds for those emergency organizations.57  Due to this Act—and the 
financial incentives within—by the close of the 1970s, each state was 
compliant with the Act, and emergency medical services in America had 
broadly adopted these national standards.58 
These standards are important today because they apply to both full-
time and volunteer emergency responders, and to the same degree.  That 
is to say, the national standards are not elevated for full-time responders, 
nor are they lessened for volunteers.  And volunteers are essential: in 
many areas, especially rural communities, there are simply no other 
viable alternatives available.59  So the value of emergency medical 
services is the same whether the provider is full-time or volunteer—the 
only difference is the cost to the community. 
D. The Emergency Services Today 
Volunteerism in the emergency services, and the high value it 
provides to its communities, is still the norm in modern emergency 
                                                        
 52.   Id. at 12. 
 53.   Id. at 13. 
 54.   Id. at 20. 
 55.   Edgerly, supra note 50. 
 56.   Emergency Medical Services Systems Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-154, 87 Stat. 594 
(1973). 
 57.   Id. 
 58.   MARIA HEWITT, RURAL EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES 56–58 (1989), 
https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk1/1989/8928/8928.PDF. 
 59.   See generally D.G. PATTERSON ET AL., RURAL HEALTH RESEARCH & POL’Y CTRS., 
PREHOSPITAL EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES PERSONNEL IN RURAL AREAS: RESULTS FROM A 
SURVEY IN NINE STATES (2015), http://depts.washington.edu/uwrhrc/uploads/RHRC_FR149_ 
Patterson.pdf. 
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services.  As noted above, a little more than 70% of fire departments are 
entirely volunteer-based.60  Also, 49% of all emergency medical 
technicians with EMT-Basic training are volunteer, and one-third of all 
states depend on volunteer EMS for medical response and transport.61  
These services are critical to America’s economic infrastructure: the 
value of this volunteered time amounts to $139.8 billion dollars per 
year.62 
The value of this volunteered time in the emergency services is 
tremendous.  The current cost of fires in the United States—$328.7 
billion—would be significantly increased if the $139.8 billion dollars’ 
worth of volunteer time were realized.63  This $139.8 billion dollars also 
represents 3.4% of the total 2017 federal budget,64 and if those wages 
were paid, it would cost more than the federal Departments of Education 
($68.2 billion), Homeland Security ($41.3 billion), and Interior ($13.2 
billion), and the Environmental Protection Agency ($8.2 billion) spent in 
2017 combined.65 
Because of this tremendous value, courts and legislatures should take 
care not to damage the volunteer emergency services without 
justification.  Particularly, courts and legislatures should not interpret or 
create laws that would undermine this fundamental American institution.  
Congress understood this importance when it created the FLSA and has 
continued to understand it when amending the FLSA’s provisions. 
III. HISTORY AND APPLICATION OF THE FLSA 
The history and evolution of the FLSA shows the respect and 
deference that Congress has given to volunteer emergency responders.  
This evolution also shows how Congress has attempted to draft and enact 
                                                        
 60.   National Fire Registry, supra note 28. 
 61.   MEARS, supra note 5, at 36; EMS System Demographics, DEP’T TRANSP. NAT’L HIGHWAY 
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. 5 (June 2014), https://www.ems.gov/pdf/National_EMS_Assessment_ 
Demographics_2011.pdf. 
 62.   HALL, supra note 32, at 29. 
 63.   Id. at i, iii, 19. 
 64.   This 3.4% represents $139.8 billion of the $4.1 trillion of the federal budget.  Budget, 
CONG. BUDGET OFF., https://www.cbo.gov/topics/budget (last visited Apr. 3, 2018). 
 65.   Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017, H.R. 244, 115th Cong. (2017), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/244/text; see also America First: A Budget 
Blueprint to Make America Great Again, OFF. BUDGET & MGMT. 50 (2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/2018_blueprint.pdf 
(tracking the amendments that changed these initial budget outlays, thus providing the total amount 
budgeted on record in 2017). 
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statutes that would not unduly damage the volunteer emergency services.  
In interpreting these statutes, courts have created tests determining whom 
the FLSA applies to.  Specifically, the Mendel court appears to employ 
two of these tests: the threshold-remuneration test and the economic 
realities test. 
A. History of the FLSA 
During the early twentieth century, “several states attempted to pass 
minimum wage laws.”66  However, two Supreme Court decisions 
rejected those attempts, declaring that such legislation violated due 
process.67  These Lochner-era cases were poorly received, prompting the 
Supreme Court to reverse itself shortly thereafter in West Coast Hotel 
Co. v. Parrish.68  In Parrish, the Supreme Court determined minimum 
wage laws were indeed compatible with due process of law.69  This 
decision, combined with the Great Depression, prompted Congress to 
look for legislative avenues to develop a minimum wage.70  In 1937, 
President Roosevelt proposed and championed the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, urging Congress to “help those who toil in factory and on farm” 
secure “a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work.”71  The FLSA was passed 
in 1938.72 
Thus, the FLSA’s primary purpose was to address the issues of 
employer abuse due to the economic conditions of the day, such as low 
                                                        
 66.   Kelly Jordan, Note, FLSA Restrictions on Volunteerism: The Institutional and Individual 
Costs in a Changing Economy, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 302, 309 (1993); see also ROBERT N. 
COVINGTON & ALVIN L. GOLDMAN, LEGISLATION PROTECTING THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE 176–
77 (1982). 
 67.   See Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936) (rejecting New York’s minimum 
wage law); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 545, 562 (1923) (rejecting the District of 
Columbia’s minimum wage law), overruled in part by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 
379 (1937). 
 68.   300 U.S. 379, 397 (1937). 
 69.   Id. at 399. 
 70.   RONNIE STEINBERG, WAGES AND HOURS: LABOR AND REFORM IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
AMERICA 109–15 (1982). 
 71.   Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on Establishing Minimum Wages and 
Maximum Hours, May 24, 1937, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15405 (last visited Apr. 9, 2018); see also Joseph V. Lane, Jr., Is the Fair Labor 
Standards Act Fairly Construed?, 13 FORDHAM L. REV. 60, 65 (1944) (discussing Roosevelt’s 
message and congressional intent in enacting the FLSA). 
 72.   29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).  For a brief overview of the FLSA’s history and scope, see also 
Michael Jilka, For Whom Does the Clock Tick: Public Employers’ Liability for Overtime 
Compensation Under Federal Law, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, June–July 1994, at 34, 35. 
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wages, unpaid overtime, and long working hours.73  Congress recognized 
this principal purpose by stating in its policy declaration that “labor 
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of 
living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of 
workers” burdened the market.74  Congress intended for the Act to be 
“the most comprehensive and pervasive federal statute in this area.”75  
The FLSA originally only applied to an entity when two conditions were 
met: (1) the person working was an employee as defined by the act; and 
(2) the business was engaged in commerce.76 
Because of the Act’s focus on commerce, the initial version of the 
FLSA did not cover governmental bodies.77  However, in 1974, the 
FLSA was amended to cover nearly all government employees at all 
levels, including state and municipal employees.78  This 1974 
amendment has sordid history at the Supreme Court.  Initially it was 
declared unconstitutional in National League of Cities v. Usery for 
violating the Commerce Clause by regulating state and municipal 
employers.79  However, it was later revalidated after the Supreme Court 
effectively overruled Usery by instituting the “traditional governmental 
functions” test in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority.80  The holding in Garcia applied the Commerce Clause far 
more broadly than it had before, reaching state actors.81  This new test 
allowed the FLSA to again apply to states and their political 
subdivisions, the Court reasoned, because the political process protected 
the states against excesses in congressional exercise of power.82 
The Garcia decision prompted more congressional changes to the 
FLSA.  Congress added § 203(e)(4)(A) of the FLSA in direct response to 
Garcia.83  This section exempts volunteers at public agencies from being 
classified as “employees” under the FLSA as long as they are, at most, 
                                                        
 73.   Jilka, supra note 72, at 35. 
 74.   29 U.S.C. § 202(a). 
 75.   JOSEPH E. KALET, PRIMER ON WAGE & HOUR LAWS v (1990); see also Jordan, supra note 
66, at 311. 
 76.   See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 295 (1985); see also 
Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1393 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 77.   Jilka, supra note 72, at 35. 
 78.   Id. 
 79.   426 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 
469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 80.   Id.; Garcia, 469 U.S. at 548. 
 81.   Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554–57. 
 82.   Id. at 555. 
 83.   H.R. REP. NO. 99-331, at 8 (1985) (citing Garcia, 469 U.S. 528).  
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paid only a “nominal fee” for work they are not otherwise employed by 
the agency to do.84  After some investigation, the House Committee on 
Education and Labor found that public agencies were dependent on 
volunteer labor, so Congress amended the FLSA in 1986 to protect local 
governmental actors’ abilities to use unpaid volunteers.85 
Because of the 1986 amendment, Congress does currently exempt 
some public employees from the FLSA.  Full-time firefighters and police 
officers are exempted under § 207(k) of the FLSA, which provides 
special rules for public agencies that hire “any employee in fire 
protection activities or any employee in law enforcement activities.”86  
This covers other employees involved in emergency services, such as 
paramedics, rescue workers, and hazardous material technicians.87 
But the basic definitions of “volunteer” and “employee” under the 
FLSA are, however, far from ideal.  The FLSA defines “employee” as 
“any individual employed by an employer.”88  This is further explained 
by the Act’s definition of “employ” as “includ[ing] to suffer or permit to 
work.”89  While this “magnificent circularity”90 appears to cover virtually 
everyone performing any kind of work, the Supreme Court noted that the 
FLSA “was obviously not intended to stamp all persons as employees.”91 
While the FLSA does not define “volunteer,” the DOL has attempted 
to provide instructive regulations.  Department regulation 29 C.F.R. § 
553.101(a) defines a volunteer as “[a]n individual who performs hours of 
service for a public agency for civic, charitable, or humanitarian reasons, 
without promise, expectation or receipt of compensation for services 
rendered.”92  Volunteers may, however, “be paid expenses, reasonable 
benefits, a nominal fee, or any combination thereof, for their service 
without losing their status as volunteers.”93  An important restriction on 
                                                        
 84.   29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(4)(A) (2012). 
 85.   H.R. REP. NO. 99-331, at 16 (1985). 
 86.   29 U.S.C. § 207(k) (2012). 
 87.   29 U.S.C. § 203(y) (2012). 
 88.   Id. § 203(e)(1). 
 89.   Id. § 203(g). 
 90.   Broussard v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., 789 F.2d 1158, 1160 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). 
 91.   Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947); see also Anthony J. Tucci, 
Note, Worthy Exemption? Examining How the DOL Should Apply the FLSA to Unpaid Interns at 
Nonprofits and Public Agencies, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1363, 1367 n.18 (2011) (noting that this quote is 
particularly persuasive as it was penned by Justice Hugo Black, who was the principal author of the 
FLSA while a U.S. Senator). 
 92.   29 C.F.R. § 553.101(a) (2017). 
 93.   29 C.F.R. § 553.106(a) (2017). 
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these payments is that they “must not be tied to productivity,”94 and a 
“key factor” in deciding whether payments are tied to productivity is 
whether the fee varies as the volunteer spends more time in the activity.95 
B. Application of the FLSA 
When a FLSA claim is made, a court “first examines whether the 
alleged employer [or business] is subject to the Act.”96  This occurs 
regardless of what test, if any, the court chooses to apply to its analysis.97  
Next, the court looks at the employer or business’s workers “to 
determine if they are ‘employees’ under the Act.”98  It does not matter if 
the individual has been labelled an employee or not;99 common law 
definitions also do not matter.100 
Due to the circular and vague definitions of “volunteer” and 
“employee” in the FLSA,101 courts have been left to find or create their 
own definitions and tests to determine who is a volunteer and who is an 
employee. 
There are two main tests used by courts to make this determination: 
the threshold-remuneration test and the economic realities test.  
However, neither of these judicially created tests properly answers the 
question of whether a volunteer emergency responder is an employee 
under the FLSA.  Luckily, neither of them is needed to do the job in this 
context: the FLSA and its regulatory guidance have given plain 
definitions for a volunteer in the emergency services.  Under the plain 
meaning of those statutes, volunteer emergency services workers are not 
employees under the FLSA in all but in the most extreme circumstances. 
                                                        
 94.   Id. § 553.106(e). 
 95.   U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter (Aug. 7, 2006), 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2006/2006_08_07_28_FLSA.htm. 
 96.   Leda E. Dunn, Note, “Protection” of Volunteers Under the Federal Employment Law: 
Discouraging Voluntarism?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 451, 456 (1992); see also 29 U.S.C. § 203 
(2006). 
 97.   Dunn, supra note 96, at 456. 
 98.   Id. 
 99.   Id. at 456, 456 n.49 (citing McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972)). 
 100.   Id. at 456, 456 n.50 (citing Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150 (1947) 
and NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1944)). 
 101.   See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. 
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1. Threshold-Remuneration Test 
When determining whether a worker is a volunteer or employee, a 
majority of federal circuits use the threshold-remuneration test.102  The 
threshold-remuneration test is tool designed to determine whether a 
worker meets the requirements for employee status.103  Under this test, 
claimants must show they received substantial compensation before the 
court will apply the other determining factors as to whether a worker is 
an employee.104 
Graves v. Women’s Professional Rodeo Association provides an 
excellent insight into how this test is applied.105  In Graves, Lance 
Graves brought a suit against the Women’s Professional Rodeo 
Association (WPRA) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964106 
because of their women-only membership policy.107  The WPRA 
approved and sponsored rodeos, and regulated its members’ behavior 
when attending and competing in these rodeos.108 
The WPRA argued that the case be dismissed because it did not fall 
under the purview of Title VII, which requires an organization or 
company to have fifteen employees before the statute applies, and the 
WPRA only employed four full-time workers.109  Graves argued that 
every WPRA member was an employee.110  The court consulted 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary to determine that 
compensation such as wages or a salary was “central” to the meaning of 
the words employ, employer, and employee.111  Thus, because WPRA 
members received no salary, wages, or other compensation as part of 
their membership, they were not employees and no further analysis was 
necessary.112 
                                                        
 102.   See Juino v. Livingston Par. Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 2013) (adopting 
the threshold remuneration test and noting that “[t]he Second, Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have adopted the threshold-remuneration test”). 
 103.   Id. 
 104.   Id. at 435, 440. 
 105.   907 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 106.   For clarification as to why Title VII is an apt comparison to the FLSA, see infra notes 
184–85 and accompanying text. 
 107.   Graves, 907 F.2d at 71. 
 108.   Id. at 72. 
 109.   Id. 
 110.   Id. 
 111.   Id. at 73. 
 112.   Id. at 73–74. 
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The Fourth Circuit also clearly addressed threshold-remuneration in 
Haavistola v. Community Fire Company of Rising Sun.113  In Haavistola, 
a female volunteer firefighter brought a Title VII action against her fire 
department.114  Haavistola was unpaid, and thus her livelihood was not 
denied due to the alleged discrimination, but she did receive other 
“benefits” from the Fire Company.115  Because of this, the lower court 
determined that a demonstration of remuneration for employment was an 
appropriate requirement.116  The Fourth Circuit ultimately reversed the 
lower court’s decision because they found the lower court made an 
impermissible finding of fact; however, the Fourth Circuit reinforced 
threshold-remuneration as a useful tool in determining a worker’s status 
as an employee.117  In total, the Second118, Fourth119, Fifth120, Eighth121, 
Tenth122, and Eleventh123 Circuits have adopted the threshold-
remuneration test.124 
2. Economic Realities Test 
A minority of circuits use the economic realities test.  But the DOL 
and its Wage and Hour Division utilize it, making it pervasive in agency 
comments on the FLSA.  While it may be useful in general 
determinations of volunteer status, it has very little purpose when applied 
to emergency services volunteers. 
Courts have concluded “the . . . definition of ‘employee’ under [the] 
FLSA extends beyond the common law.”125  In its place, courts have 
created the far more subjective “economic realities” test to determine 
                                                        
 113.   6 F.3d 211, 219 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 114.   Id. at 213. 
 115.   Id. at 213–14, 221. 
 116.   Id. at 220–22. 
 117.   Id. at 219–22. 
 118.   O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 119.   Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 220–21. 
 120.   Juino v. Livingston Par. Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 439 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 121.   Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 122.   McGuinness v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 170 F.3d 974, 979 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 123.   Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1243–44 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 124.   Erin Welch, Comment, Unequal Protection for Equal Work: Juino v. Livingston Parish 
Fire District No. 5, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 317, 320 (2014). 
 125.   Benjamin Burry, Comment, Testing Economic Reality: FLSA and Title VII Protection for 
Workfare Participants, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 561, 564 (2009); see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (explaining that the FLSA’s definition of “employee” covers 
parties beyond the common-law definition). 
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whether a worker meets the FLSA definition of employee.126  This test 
assesses the entire relationship between the employer and worker, instead 
of considering isolated factors.127 
The economic realities test was created because of the focus on the 
standard of control in the common-law agency test.128  The Supreme 
Court first noted the need for the economic reality test in Bartels v. 
Birmingham, where it stated that courts need to recognize that workers 
are “as a matter of economic reality” dependent upon those who hired 
them, or that because the worker is dependent on the hiring agent, they 
require legal recognition as employees.129  It later adopted the economic 
realities test in Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of 
Labor.130 
In Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation, a foundation that provided 
services to former drug addicts and criminals in exchange for labor 
protested their classification as employees.131  The Supreme Court held 
that these individuals were “entirely dependent upon the Foundation for 
long periods” of time—in some cases, years—thus an expectation for 
compensation was reasonable and the workers were employees.132 
The Ninth Circuit uses the most common example of the economic 
realities test.  In Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, the 
court set forth the following four basic factors to determine if a worker is 
an employee under the FLSA: 1) whether the employer “had the power 
to hire and fire” the worker; 2) whether the employer “determined the 
rate and method of payment,” 3) whether the employer “supervised and 
controlled [the worker’s] schedules or conditions of employment”; and 
4) whether the employer “maintained employment records” of the 
worker’s activity.133  None of these four factors is dispositive; instead, 
courts are to look at the totality of the circumstances when determining 
                                                        
 126.   Burry, supra note 125, at 564; see also Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 
28, 33 (1966) (holding that under the “economic reality” test, workers who labored at their homes 
were employees, despite the company’s contrary designation). 
 127.   Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730–31 (1947) (evaluating at the 
circumstances of the labor, instead of isolated factors, to find that meat boners were employees of a 
slaughtering plant under the FLSA). 
 128.   Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 75, 102 (1984). 
 129.   Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947). 
 130.   471 U.S. 290, 290 (1985). 
 131.   Id. at 293, 300–01. 
 132.   Id. at 301 (quoting the district court’s opinion in the same case). 
 133.   704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Villarreal v. Woodman, 113 F.3d 202, 205 
(11th Cir. 1997) (discussing the history of application of the Bonnette factors). 
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whether the Bonnette factors create an employer-employee 
relationship.134  Other federal circuits that apply this test have utilized the 
Bonnette factors.135 
But the DOL has issued different guidelines on how the economic 
realities test should be applied to the FLSA.  The DOL recognized that 
volunteer status “can only be determined by examining the total amount 
of payments made . . . in the context of the economic realities of the 
particular situation.”136  To that end, the DOL promulgated a 
nonexclusive set of factors to consider in making that assessment: 
Individuals do not lose their volunteer status if they receive a nominal 
fee from a public agency.  A nominal fee is not a substitute for 
compensation and must not be tied to productivity.  However, this does 
not preclude the payment of a nominal amount on a “per call” or 
similar basis to volunteer firefighters.  The following factors will be 
among those examined in determining whether a given amount is 
nominal: [t]he distance traveled and the time and effort expended by 
the volunteer; whether the volunteer has agreed to be available around-
the-clock or only during certain specified time periods; and whether the 
volunteer provides services as needed or throughout the year.  An 
individual who volunteers to provide periodic services on a year-round 
basis may receive a nominal monthly or annual stipend or fee without 
losing volunteer status.137 
This regulation has been applied in many courts.  In Purdham v. Fairfax 
County School Board, a case relied upon by the Mendel court, the Fourth 
Circuit applied this regulation to find that a school’s stipend of roughly 
$2,100—or $6.05 per hour—paid to a golf instructor was nominal under 
the FLSA because: 1) it was far less than his hourly salary at his full-time 
job, 2) he could spend as much or as little time in the role as he wished, 
and 3) the stipend was fixed.138  Thus, Purdham was found to be a 
volunteer under the FLSA, not an employee.139 
Similarly, in Brown v. New York City Department of Education, the 
Second Circuit applied the DOL’s administrative guidance.140  In doing 
so, it found that a worker tasked with group conflict resolution was not 
an employee under the FLSA because the worker received roughly 
                                                        
 134.   Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 135.   See Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470; Villarreal, 113 F.3d at 205. 
 136.   29 C.F.R. § 553.106(f) (2017). 
 137.   Id. at § 553.106(e). 
 138.   637 F.3d 421, 434 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 139.   Id. 
 140.   755 F.3d 154, 169 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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$1450 over three years, and that reimbursed meals and subway fees fell 
within the expenses covered under 29 C.F.R. § 553.106(b).141 
This regulation has also been applied in the emergency services 
context as well.  In Harris v. Mecosta County, the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Michigan found that Mecosta County’s 
EMS first responders were volunteers under the FLSA.142  In doing so, 
the court applied 29 C.F.R. § 553.106, as well as other guidance by the 
DOL toward public agency volunteers, to find that paying workers $7.50 
per hour during emergency responses was nominal.143  Additionally, 
because the workers participated voluntarily and did so without the 
expectation of compensation, they were volunteers under the FLSA.144 
IV. MENDEL V. CITY OF GIBRALTAR 
In Mendel, the Sixth Circuit addressed the question of whether 
volunteer firefighters who receive an hourly wage when responding to 
calls were “employees” or “volunteers” under both the FLSA and the 
Family Medical Leave Act (the “FMLA”).145  Paul Mendel, a police 
dispatcher, was employed by the City of Gibraltar.146  After being fired, 
he sued Gibraltar for violating his rights under the FMLA.147  The district 
court granted summary judgment to Gibraltar because it did not classify 
the volunteer firefighters working for the city as “employees,” and thus, 
Gibraltar only employed forty-one employees, less than the requisite fifty 
employees necessary to bring a claim under the FMLA.148 
The Sixth Circuit disagreed and reversed the district court, finding 
the volunteer firefighters to be employees under both the FMLA and the 
FLSA.149  The Court noted their holding implicated both of these statutes 
because under 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) of the FMLA, the definition of 
“employee” and “employer” have the same definitions as under the 
FLSA.150  Starting from there, the court noted the FLSA’s definition of 
“employee” is “any individual employed by an employer,” and “employ” 
                                                        
 141.   Id. 
 142.   No. 1:95-CV-61, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1882, at *12 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 1996). 
 143.   Id. at *9–10. 
 144.   Id. 
 145.   Mendel v. City of Gibraltar, 727 F.3d 565, 567 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 146.   Id. 
 147.   Id. 
 148.   Id. 
 149.   Id. at 572. 
 150.   Id. at 569. 
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is defined as “to suffer or permit to work.”151  Finding little help there, 
the court noted jurisprudence that found the FLSA was to be construed 
liberally when determining whether an individual is an “employee.”152 
The court then engaged in an assessment of the volunteer firefighters 
under the economic realities test.153  It found the firefighters received 
substantial compensation for their work: $15 per hour while responding 
to an emergency.154  The court found this amount substantial because 
nearby communities paid their full-time firefighters between $14 and $17 
per hour, and the chief of the Gibraltar Fire Department made roughly 
$19 per hour for work.155  Thus, because the firefighters were “permitted 
to work,” and because they received substantial compensation, they were 
“employees” under the FLSA and the FMLA.156 
But the court recognized there was a catch: Congress’s 1986 
amendment clarifying that volunteers for a public agency are not to be 
classified as employees under the FLSA.157  Because that amendment 
clarified that volunteers for public agencies may still be considered 
employees if they receive more than a “nominal fee,” the court focused 
its attention on whether the $15 per hour paid to Gilbraltar’s firefighters 
while responding to emergencies was more than “nominal.”158 
To determine whether these payments were “nominal,” the court 
turned to the DOL’s guidance.159  Of all the guidance the court reviewed, 
two are of interest: 29 C.F.R. § 553.106(e), which does not preclude 
payment to volunteers on a “per-call” basis, and 29 C.F.R. § 553.106(f), 
which states that whether or not a worker keeps his “volunteer” status is 
to be based upon “the total amount of payments made (expenses, 
benefits, fees) in the context of the economic realities of the particular 
situation.”160 
This agency guidance is of interest largely because the court, after 
listing them, ignored them.  The court went on to essentially restate that 
because the volunteer firefighters in Gibraltar were given an hourly fee 
                                                        
 151.   Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2012) and 29 U.S.C. § 203(g)). 
 152.   Id. 
 153.   Id. at 569–70. 
 154.   Id. at 567. 
 155.   Id. at 567–68. 
 156.   Id. at 570. 
 157.   Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (2012)). 
 158.   Id.  
 159.   Id. 
 160.   Id. at 570–71 (emphasis added). 
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comparable to nearby full-time counterparts, the fee was not “nominal,” 
and thus, the firefighters did not fall under the 1986 amendment and 
were “employees” under the FLSA.161 
To bolster its conclusion, the court cited to Purdham v. Fairfax 
County School Board, a case where a school’s golf coach was found not 
to be an employee because his total fee, if converted to an hourly rate, 
would equal roughly one-quarter of a full-time equivalent.162  It also cited 
to Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation’s holding “that those who ‘work in 
contemplation of compensation’ are ‘employees’” under the FLSA, even 
if those workers consider themselves volunteers.163  The court then 
declared, ipse dixit, the “inescapable fact” that the firefighters in 
Gibraltar only worked in “contemplation of compensation.”164 
Of special note is the court’s statement in a footnote.  One sentence 
before concluding the opinion, the court stated that the fees the Gibraltar 
firefighters received were substantial, not nominal, and thus the 
firefighters were employees under the FLSA.165  In the footnote 
following this sentence, the court stated, “We deem it unnecessary on the 
facts of this case to address the validity of the [DOL’s] proposed 
‘twenty-percent test’ for determining whether a given payment 
constitutes compensation or a nominal fee.”166  With this simple hand-
wave, the court ignored a critical piece of guidance from the DOL that 
could have changed the outcome of the case. 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Mendel court erred when it held the Gibraltar volunteer 
firefighters were employees under the FLSA.  To reach that conclusion, 
it applied two judicially-created tests to determine if these firefighters 
were “employees” under the FLSA: the threshold-remuneration test and 
the economic realities test.  Both are ill-suited to determine whether a 
volunteer in the emergency services is an “employee” under the FLSA.  
Instead, the court should have looked to the text of the FLSA, the clear 
congressional intent, and the DOL’s guidance on the issue. 
                                                        
 161.   Id. at 571–72. 
 162.   Id. at 571 (citing Purdham v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 637 F.3d 421, 433–34 (4th Cir. 2011)). 
 163.   Id. (citing Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 306 (1985)). 
 164.   Id.  
 165.   Id. at 572. 
 166.   Id. at 572 n.8. 
2018 THE ROOF IS ON FIRE 839 
 
Alternatively, the Mendel court should have given more agency 
deference to the DOL.  If the court had done so, and followed the DOL’s 
recommendation that “nominal” be defined as 20 percent of the pay of a 
full-time equivalent, it almost certainly would have found the Gibraltar 
firefighters were not employees under the FLSA. 
A. Failings of the Threshold-Remuneration Test 
Under the threshold-remuneration test, a litigant making a claim 
under the FLSA must show they received substantial compensation 
before the court will apply the other determining factors as to whether a 
worker is an employee.167  Specifically, the claimant must show they 
received “significant remuneration.”168  If the litigant succeeds in making 
this showing, courts are much more likely to determine the litigant is an 
“employee” under the FLSA.169  However, the way this test is currently 
applied by the courts has resulted in illogical decisions—and in the 
context of volunteer emergency responders, the application of this test 
has led to decisions that undermine what it means to be a volunteer. 
The definition of “significant remuneration” has become so strained 
that nearly any benefit meets this threshold.170  Under a plain reading of 
“significant remuneration” in context of the threshold-remuneration test, 
if a volunteer emergency responder is only being paid a stipend and 
nominal benefits for their labor while responding to an emergency, they 
should not be classified as an “employee” under the FLSA.  But this isn’t 
so. 
For example, in Pietras v. Board of Fire Commissioners, a 
probationary firefighter in the Farmingville Fire Department of New 
York brought a suit for sex discrimination after twice failing to pass an 
introductory physical agility test.171  The fire department argued that 
Pietras was not yet even officially on the department, but was only a 
                                                        
 167.   Id. at 571. 
 168.   Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs, 180 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Seattle Opera v. 
NLRB, 292 F.3d 757, 762–65 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Rafi v. Thompson, No. 02-2356 (JR), 2006 WL 
3091483, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2006), aff’d sub nom. Rafi v. Sebelius, 377 F. App’x 24 (D.C. Cir. 
2010). 
 169.   See generally Pietras, 180 F.3d 468; Seattle Opera, 292 F.3d 757; Rafi, 2006 WL 
3091483.  
 170.   See, e.g., Pietras, 180 F.3d at 473 (holding that benefits from the state meet the threshold); 
Seattle Opera, 292 F.3d at 763–64 (holding that a modest travel reimbursement is sufficient 
remuneration); Rafi, 2006 WL 3091483, at *1 (suggesting that “a clear pathway to employment” and 
an “increased opportunity to participate” in a medical training program is sufficient remuneration). 
 171.   Pietras, 180 F.3d at 471. 
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probationary volunteer.172  The Second Circuit disagreed.173  Citing to the 
New York Firefighter’s Benefit Law,174 it noted that Pietras was eligible 
for both a retirement pension and a disability pension, and these benefits 
constituted significant remuneration.175  The court did not expressly note 
the monetary value of any of these benefits, only that a retirement 
pension and a disability pension were more significant than a disability 
pension alone and significant enough to create an employer-employee 
relationship.176 
The holding in Pietras makes little sense.  First, many fire 
departments offer volunteers retirement and disability benefits.177  While 
many of these benefits are potentially paid out by private insurers, in 
these instances the state normally pays the premiums of these benefits.178 
So, if the standard for “significant remuneration” is the combination of 
both benefits, the word “volunteer” is no longer accurate when it comes 
to unpaid emergency responders.  Second, Pietras arguably received no 
benefit from these programs.  There is no evidence in the opinion that 
she cashed out of these programs out for any financial benefit, nor is 
there any evidence in the opinion that she had planned to purchase 
retirement or disability coverage but was saved the expense by this 
benefit.179  So, the only value she received appears to be the intangible 
peace-of-mind that she would have these benefits if she ever needed 
them.  As kitsch t-shirts and coffee mugs say: “Peace of mind doesn’t 
pay the bills.”180 
And Pietras is not an outlier.  In Seattle Opera v. NLRB, the Seattle 
Opera appealed the National Labor Relations Board’s ruling that 
volunteer choristers were employees under the National Labor Relations 
                                                        
 172.   Id. at 471–72. 
 173.   Id. at 475. 
 174.   N.Y. VOL. FIRE. BEN. LAW §§ 5–25 (McKinney 2016). 
 175.   Pietras, 180 F.3d at 473. 
 176.   Id. at 473 n.6. 
 177.   See, e.g., Kansas Firefighter Relief Act, KAN. INS. DEP’T, 
http://www.ksinsurance.org/otherservices/firefighter-relief-act.php (last visited Apr. 11, 2018); 
Statewide Volunteer Firefighter Retirement Plan, PUB. EMPS. RETIREMENT ASS’N MINN. (Mar. 9, 
2018, 7:43 AM), http://www.mnpera.org/index.asp?SEC=D09EE783-90AF-4CE0-B34E-
4A85C43E3EFA&Type=B_BASIC; Retiree Benefits, TESRS: TEX. EMERGENCY SERVS. 
RETIREMENT SYS., http://www.tesrs.org/benefit-overview (last visited Apr. 11, 2018). 
 178.  See generally id. (detailing, in all the above states, how these funds collect money, and how 
they pay out benefits to the their firefighter recipients). 
 179.   Pietras, 180 F.3d 468. 
 180.   THOMAS D. SHARTS, SHARTSY’S ARTSY SAYINGS 11 (2015). 
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Act.181  The choristers received a stipend of $214, compensating for 77 
hours of work—or $2.78 per hour.182  The D.C. Circuit considered this 
sufficient remuneration, despite their volunteer involvement in the 
activity.183  Thus, the court in Seattle Opera affirmed the NLRB’s 
determination that the choristers were employees and therefore should 
have been included in collective bargaining agreements.184 
This is an absurd result.  $2.78 per hour would not be considered 
sufficient remuneration for employment anywhere in the United States in 
2002, the year Seattle Opera was decided.  And $2.78 per hour was not 
significant remuneration under federal law, either: the minimum wage at 
that time was $5.15, or nearly double what the choristers were being 
paid.185 
In the context of volunteer emergency responders, application of 
these cases unequivocally makes them “employees” and not volunteers.  
While both cases deal with the definition of “employee” under different 
standards than the FLSA—Title VII and the NLRA, respectively—their 
interpretation of “significant remuneration” is important.  Whether a 
worker is an employee fulfills the same function under each law: it is a 
jurisdictional requirement to see if the worker qualifies for the law’s 
protections.186  Additionally, both laws have definitions of “employee” as 
vague as the FLSA’s.187  And as all three are federal statutes, comparing 
threshold-remuneration among them is apt. 
Applying these cases to volunteers in the emergency services would 
effectively eliminate any legal classification of these workers as 
volunteers.  Volunteer emergency responders must receive specialized 
training and meet the national standards and certifications required for 
their type of work.188  Nearly every volunteer department currently 
provides or pays for training, and this makes sense—why would a 
department financially burden individuals who want to donate their time 
                                                        
 181.   Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 757, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 182.   Id. at 773 (Randolph, J., dissenting). 
 183.   Id. at 762–65. 
 184.   Id. 
 185.   See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (2006) (amended 2007). 
 186.   See Dunn, supra note 96, at 459 n.73. 
 187.   See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012) (“The term ‘employee’ shall include any employee . . . .”); 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2012) (“The term ‘employee’ means an individual employed by an 
employer. . . .”). 
 188.   See generally NAT’L FIRE PROTECTION ASS’N, NFPA 1001: STANDARD FOR FIRE FIGHTER 
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS (2013), https://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/all-codes-and-
standards/list-of-codes-and-standards/detail?code=1001. 
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to their community?  A volunteer program requiring an ongoing 
monetary investment by the volunteer is not likely to be attractive, and as 
noted above, volunteerism rates in the emergency services are already 
dropping.189 
A court finding $2.78 to be significant remuneration under the FLSA 
speaks directly against the underlying purpose of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act.  A key provision of the FLSA is the establishment a 
national minimum wage.190  The FLSA has prescribed a number more 
than twice as large as $2.78 be that wage.191  So while it is unlikely an 
ordinary worker would be satisfied with $2.78 per hour, it is certain that 
such a wage would be in violation of the FLSA.  This is not to say that 
the national minimum wage should be the bright-line test for 
significance, but rather, it makes little sense for a court to find a wage 
lower than the minimum prescribed in the FLSA to still be “significant” 
under that same statute. 
Therefore, the threshold-remuneration test, in its current form, fails 
to properly address the particulars that surround emergency services 
volunteers.  The test has become so strained that even wages below the 
national minimum wage are considered “significant”—and since many 
volunteer emergency responders receive some sort of stipend or 
reimbursement per call, there is a very real possibility of 
misclassification of these volunteers under this test. 
B. Failings of the Economic Realities Test 
The economic realities test was created because, in the common-law 
agency test, courts used to focus on the standard of control.192  In light of 
an evolving workplace, the Supreme Court held that courts need to 
recognize that workers are “as a matter of economic reality” dependent 
upon those who hired them.193  Thus, if workers are dependent upon their 
employers, they are “employees” as a matter of the economic reality of 
their relationship.194 
                                                        
 189.   Andrew Brown & Ian Urbina, The Disappearing Volunteer Firefighter, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/17/sunday-review/the-disappearing-volunteer-
firefighter.html?mcubz=3&_r=0. 
 190.  29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C) (2012); see also Minimum Wage, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & 
HOUR DIV., https://www.dol.gov/whd/minimumwage.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2018). 
 191.   29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C) (2012). 
 192.   See Dowd, supra note 128. 
 193.   Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947). 
 194.   Id. 
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Generally, when determining if a worker is an “employee” as a 
matter of economic reality, courts look to the following Bonnette factors: 
1) whether the employer had the power to hire and fire the worker; 2) 
whether the employer determined the rate of payment; 3) whether the 
employer supervised and controlled the worker’s schedules or conditions 
of employment; and 4) whether the employer maintained employment 
records of the worker’s activity.195 
This version of the economic realities test is a mess of imprecision 
and “purposelessness.”196  The economic realities test has “degenerated 
into a disembodied laundry list of factors,”197 a list of factors that judges 
check off without looking at the statutory purpose.198  But this test was 
originally created to assess the entire relationship between the employer 
and worker, instead of creating a simple factor check-off sheet.199 
There is a real danger in applying the check-off sheet version of the 
economic realities test when evaluating whether volunteer emergency 
responders are “employees” under the FLSA.  Without contextualizing 
the circumstances and instead merely mechanically checking off factors, 
the Bonnette factors favor classifying volunteer emergency responders as 
employees. 
The first factor deals with whether an employer has the power to hire 
and fire a worker.  It is axiomatic that emergency responders are critical 
to the mission of an emergency department’s responding to emergencies.  
The relationship between the responder and the department is 
presumptively “permanent,” another factor in the test.  In terms of 
permanency, the standard is whether there is an explicit or implicit 
understanding of when the working relationship will end.200  In terms of 
                                                        
 195.   Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983); see also 
Villarreal v. Woodman, 113 F.3d 202, 205 (11th Cir. 1997) (discussing the history of application of 
the Bonnette factors). 
 196.   See Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An 
Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 
187, 195–97 (1999). 
 197.   Id. at 208 (citing Reich v. Priba Corp., 890 F. Supp. 586, 592 (N.D. Tex. 1995)). 
 198.   Id. at 208, 211. 
 199.   See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947) (evaluating the 
circumstances of the labor, instead of isolated factors, to find that meat boners were employees of a 
slaughtering plant under the FLSA). 
 200.   Charles J. Muhl, What is an Employee? The Answer Depends on the Federal Law, 
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Jan. 2002, at 3 (available at https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2002/ 
01/art1full.pdf); see also U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR DIVISION, FACT SHEET #13: 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) 1 (2008), 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs13.pdf. 
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emergency response, most volunteers intend to work for their department 
as long as their community has a need—and there is no community 
without emergencies. 
The next factor—whether the employer determined the rate of 
payment or provided equipment—also strongly favors classifying 
responders as employees.  Personal protective gear is expensive and is 
almost universally provided by the department,201 and emergency 
apparatus like fire engines and ambulances can cost in the millions.202 
Critically, under the factor of “control,” a volunteer department may 
appear to have a greater amount of control over its responders than most 
working environments.  Most volunteer departments have a quota of 
emergencies that a volunteer must participate in to maintain “active” 
status.203  To respond, an employee must be either at the station or within 
a response range of just a few minutes—usually less than nine for urban 
areas and fourteen minutes for rural areas.204  Volunteer responders must 
also remain in uniform or have it immediately nearby, must carry a radio 
or some type of notification device, and are restricted from activities that 
would alter their cognitive abilities.205  And as emergencies are 
inherently unpredictable, a volunteer responder may be on-call for over 
twenty-four hours at a time.206  This represents a far greater amount of 
control than that over a typical nine-to-five worker—a heavy factor in 
support of employee classification for a judge who chooses not to respect 
statutory purpose. 
Finally, the recordkeeping factor favors classification of these 
responders as employees as well.  All departments are required to keep 
track of their emergency responses and log them into the National Fire 
                                                        
 201.   See Lynn M. Boorady et al., Exploration of Firefighter Turnout Gear: Part 1: Identifying 
Male Firefighter User Needs, J. TEXTILE & APPAREL, TECH. & MGMT., Spring 2013, at 1, 2, 9. 
 202.   Christina Tatu, Municipalities Face Growing Sticker Shock When Replacing Fire Trucks, 
MORNING CALL (Oct. 11, 2015, 11:49 PM), http://www.mcall.com/news/local/mc-high-cost-fire-
trucks-20151011-story.html. 
 203.   See GARY R. URBANOWICZ, BADGES OF THE BRAVEST: A PICTORIAL HISTORY OF FIRE 
DEPARTMENTS IN NEW YORK CITY 80 (2002). 
 204.   See NFPA 1720: Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression 
Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Volunteer Fire 
Departments, 2010 Edition, NAT’L FIRE PROTECTION ASS’N, http://www.nfpa.org/Codes-and-
Standards/ARCHIVED/Safer-Act-Grant/NFPA-1720 (last visited Apr. 11, 2018). 
 205.   See J. CURTIS VARONE, LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR FIRE AND EMERGENCY SERVICES 
469–71 (3rd ed. 2014) (quoting Renfro v. City of Emporia, 948 F.2d 1529, 1538 (10th Cir. 1991)). 
 206.   Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF LAB, WAGE & HOUR DIVISION, FACT SHEET #8: LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND FIRE PROTECTION EMPLOYEES UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 
(FLSA) 2 (2011), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs8.pdf. 
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Incident Reporting System.207  So, as a matter of common and expected 
practice, emergency response departments keep track and maintain 
records of the worker’s activity. 
It appears at least one commentator208 is correct: judges interpreting 
the economic realities test on volunteer firefighters have not looked to 
the statutory purpose of the FLSA.  In Mendel v. City of Gibraltar, the 
volunteer firefighter case in this article’s introduction, the judges 
engaged in an assessment of the economic realities of volunteer 
responders receiving $15 per hour while on a call and no wage while 
doing other work at the station.209  After assessing the DOL factors, the 
court held that, in the context of the economic realities of this particular 
situation, the wages were compensation under the FLSA because the 
firefighters “render[ed] services with the promise, expectation, and 
receipt of substantial compensation.”210  Thus, the responders were 
entitled to compensation for time spent doing work for the department 
beyond emergency response.211 
Even ignoring that the court began with the economic realities test 
and ended with the threshold-remuneration test, its rationale 
fundamentally misunderstands the current state of volunteer departments.  
Many departments either pay a volunteer a stipend per alarm responded 
to or an hourly amount while working an alarm.212  None of this is 
offered as an alternative to a full-time job; rather, it is provided as both 
an incentive to seek and retain volunteers.213  In a world where many 
households are dual-income, paying a stipend or gratuity for time spent 
on alarms is an excellent way to add value to a role that many would like 
to be a part of but otherwise lack the economic flexibility to spend time 
away from home without reimbursement. 
The court’s decision in Mendel also misunderstands “work in 
contemplation of compensation.”  The court held that because $15 per 
hour was substantial compensation, it was “inescapable” that the 
                                                        
 207.   About the National Fire Incident Reporting System, U.S. FIRE ADMIN. (Feb. 22, 2018), 
https://www.usfa.fema.gov/data/nfirs/about/. 
 208.   Linder, supra note 196, at 195–97. 
 209.   727 F.3d 565, 567 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 210.   Id. at 571. 
 211.   Id. at 572. 
 212.   U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter (Sept. 17, 2007), 
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volunteers “work[ed] in contemplation of compensation.”214  To reach 
this supposedly inescapable conclusion, they cite to Tony & Susan Alamo 
Foundation v. Secretary of Labor.215  But that case is not a good 
comparison because the workers in that case were homeless or otherwise 
at-risk individuals entirely dependent on the Foundation for their basic 
needs.216  That is a situation worlds away from Mendel.  In Mendel, there 
is no indication in the opinion that any volunteer firefighter on that 
department was dependent on the $15 per hour they received while on an 
alarm.  And not only was Gibraltar’s fire department mostly volunteer, 
but the only paid member was the fire chief, who was compensated 
$20,000 per year.217 
And $20,000 per year is nearly an order of magnitude more than any 
other member of Gibraltar Fire would likely make.  Gibraltar, Michigan 
is a city of 4,200, and has 34 emergency responders in the department.218  
While there are no direct statistics available on the number of 
emergencies the Gibraltar fire department responded to each year, 
estimates are that a town with “a population of 10,000 people will 
generate an average of one emergency [call] per day.”219  So, using that 
number as a guideline, Gibraltar’s population of 4,200 would have 
generated approximately 155 emergencies per year.  At a generous 
average of two hours per alarm, if a volunteer worked every single 
emergency in Gibraltar, they would have clocked 310 hours—or, at $15 
per hour, $4,650.  In fact, while the Mendel case was before the district 
court, the City of Gibraltar put on evidence that the average Form-1099 
for volunteer firefighters was $1,500.220  So, the court’s conclusion that 
Gibraltar emergency responders attended weekly meetings, mandatory 
trainings, and placed themselves on call at all hours of the day in 
contemplation of—at most—$4,650 defies logic. 
                                                        
 214.   Mendel, 727 F.3d at 571. 
 215.   471 U.S. 290, 300–02, 306 (1985). 
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 217.   Mendel, 727 F.3d at 567–68. 
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2018 THE ROOF IS ON FIRE 847 
 
C. The Solution: Text of the FLSA and the DOL’s 20-Percent Test 
The text of the FLSA, combined with subsequent regulatory 
guidance from the DOL, gives the best guidance as to how to address 
whether emergency responders are volunteers.  Not only has Congress 
directly addressed the issue of volunteer emergency responders under the 
FLSA, but the DOL has also subsequently issued guidance on the issue 
as well.  Together, the two create a clear framework of who is a 
volunteer in the emergency services, and who isn’t. 
Congress was aware of the risk of volunteer emergency responders 
being classified as employees, and addressed that concern by adding 
explicit language on the subject.221  In 1986, the FLSA was amended to 
make clear that workers who volunteer at a public agency are not 
employees under the FLSA.222  29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(4)(A) now reads: 
The term “employee” does not include any individual who volunteers 
to perform services for a public agency which is a State, a political 
subdivision of a State, or an interstate governmental agency, if— 
(i) the individual receives no compensation or is paid expenses, 
reasonable benefits, or a nominal fee to perform the services for which 
the individual volunteered; and 
(ii) such services are not the same type of services which the individual 
is employed to perform for such public agency.223 
The issue that immediately appears is the question of what “expenses, 
reasonable benefits, or a nominal fee” consists of.  Curiously, courts, 
such as the one in Pietras, either were not aware of § 203(e), or found 
that disability and retirement benefits were unreasonably lavish benefits.  
However, for a career that consistently ranks in the top ten of most 
dangerous careers,224 has a lower average lifespan than that of non-
emergency responders,225 and has a lower average retirement age due to 
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illness and injury,226 finding disability and retirement benefits 
unreasonable is puzzling. 
The issue of “reasonable benefits” aside, uncertainty around 
“nominal fee” has caused the bigger issue.  In Mendel, as discussed 
above, the Sixth Circuit found a likely wage of $1,500 to $4,650 per year 
was significant remuneration, thus classifying the emergency responders 
as employees and triggering the FLSA.227  However, the DOL has issued 
guidance that provides a better framework for analyzing whether the 
money paid to the Gilbraltar responders was “nominal” under the FLSA. 
The DOL issued an opinion letter in 2004 about what a nominal fee 
is under the FLSA.228  The DOL explained that Congress set a firm 
definition for “incidental” in the FLSA by creating a “20-percent test to 
determine whether something is insubstantial.”229  While that provision 
dealt specifically with how much of an employee’s time was spent 
driving, the DOL used that definition to apply to wages as well.230  Thus, 
when considering whether a volunteer’s wages were nominal under the 
FLSA, the DOL stated that as long as a volunteer was being paid less 
than 20% of a full-time counterpart, the wages were nominal.231 
In 2006, the DOL took this definition and applied it to volunteer 
emergency responders.232  They reaffirmed their belief that the 20-
percent test was the best and most reliable yardstick to determine 
whether an emergency responder was a volunteer under the FLSA.233  
But they went a step further: noting that there is a specific allowance for 
emergency responders to be paid per emergency,234 the DOL stated this 
20-percent test, when applied to volunteer emergency responders, should 
be used to look at their total monetary compensation compared to their 
                                                        
firefighters have a higher fatality rate than other workers). 
 226.   See Michael Wilson, Past 50, and Still Running into the Flames, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/27/nyregion/27firefighters.html (noting that only 5.5% of 
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 227.   See supra notes 216–19 and accompanying text. 
 228.   U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter (Nov. 10, 2005), 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2005/2005_11_10_51_FLSA.pdf. 
 229.   Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(6)(G)). 
 230.   Id. 
 231.   Id. 
 232.   U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter (Aug. 7, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 
Opinion Letter], https://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2006/2006_08_07_28_FLSA.htm. 
 233.   Id. 
 234.   See 29 C.F.R. § 553.106(e) (2017). 
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full-time counterparts, as opposed to compensation per emergency—or 
presumptively per hour.235 
This distinction is critical because it resolves the conflict of how to 
analyze volunteer emergency responders under their various 
reimbursement programs.  As noted in the introduction, an important 
restriction on payments to general volunteers is that the payments “must 
not be tied to productivity,”236 and a key factor in deciding whether 
payments are tied to productivity is whether the fee varies as the 
volunteer spends more time in the activity.237 
This type of consideration is what has caused so many courts 
difficulty in dealing with volunteer emergency responders.  Consider 
Mendel: the court noted the volunteers’ wages went up or down based on 
the number of emergencies; thus, the reimbursement both was tied to 
productivity and whether the volunteer spent more time in the activity—
indicators of employment under § 553.106(e).238  The court then viewed 
the wages of time spent specifically in the activity—responding to 
emergencies—against the area’s full-time average, and found them to be 
similar.239  Thus, the firefighters were employees, not volunteers,240 
despite making at most $4,650 per year.241 
But the DOL’s 2006 distinction completely changes that analysis.  In 
Mendel, the court notes the typical full-time emergency responder in that 
area were paid between $14 to $17 per hour, or $28,560 to $34,680 
annually.242  Again, under the most generous time allowance per alarm, 
and were we to even allow that a firefighter in Gibraltar responded to 
every single emergency in his community in a calendar year, he would 
make $4,650.243  When we apply the total-compensation test from the 
DOL’s 2006 opinion, that firefighter’s maximum wages represent 13% to 
                                                        
 235.   2006 Opinion Letter, supra note 232. 
 236.   29 C.F.R. § 553.106(e). 
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16% of what his full-time replacement would be, which are within the 
tolerances of the 20-percent test. 
Again, this hypothetical was presented in the most favorable terms 
for Mendel’s case: these firefighters were almost certainly paid 
considerably less than $4,650.  As previously discussed, the City of 
Gibraltar put on evidence that the average Form-1099 for volunteer 
firefighters was $1,500.244  Thus, firefighters in Gibraltar would be 
volunteers under the FLSA, not employees—completely reversing the 
Sixth Circuit’s holding. 
This is the better result, both as a matter of statutory interpretation as 
well as a matter of practicality.  As noted in the preamble to § 
553.106(e), over 30% of all volunteer responders receive reimbursement 
per call, and that regulation’s provisions were not meant to invalidate 
that arrangement.245  So, had the court deferred to the DOL’s guidance 
instead of relegating it to a hand-wave footnote, it would have looked to 
firefighters in Gibraltar’s total compensation instead of their per-call 
wages. 
D. Agency Deference to the DOL’s 20-Percent Test 
Courts should defer to the DOL’s guidance when assessing volunteer 
status under the FLSA.  Scholars have stated that the ability to adjust 
policies in response to social change is essential to the operation of 
administrative agencies.246  Agencies may change their policies and are 
permitted to revise their interpretations of ambiguous statutes when a 
confronted with a new or unforeseen issue.247  The seminal case in 
setting forth this deference is Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.248  In Chevron, the Supreme Court addressed how 
to interpret the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) guidance on 
the Clean Air Act, and how much authority that guidance was to be given 
in the face of ambiguities in the statute.249  Ultimately, the Court found 
                                                        
 244.   Mendel v. City of Gibraltar, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1036 (E.D. Mich. 2012), rev’d, 727 
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that the EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act was a permissible 
construction, and because an administrative agency has congressional 
authority to address statutory ambiguity, the EPA’s interpretation was 
upheld.250  In doing so, the Court said: 
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an 
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific 
provision of the statute . . . .  Sometimes the legislative delegation to an 
agency . . . is implicit rather than explicit.  In such a case, a court may 
not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a 
reasonable interpretation made by . . . an agency. . . .  [C]onsiderable 
weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of 
a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer[.]251 
This deference to agency interpretation was later amended by United 
States v. Mead.252  Under Mead, agencies can only apply for “Chevron 
deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the 
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and [where] the 
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the 
exercise of that authority.”253  In other words, a court addressing a 
statutory ambiguity has the choice to determine whether to give an 
administrative agency’s interpretation deference. 
This movement away from agency deference has been met with 
criticism.  Some scholars believe Mead incentivizes courts to entirely 
ignore an administrative agency’s guidance.254  Others have noted that 
the movement away from firm standards in Mead has produced “a great 
deal of confusion and error.”255 
These criticisms are correct.  Within the context of the FLSA, courts 
now regularly ignore the DOL’s guidance.  Prior to Mead, the DOL’s 
guidance saw regular deference in federal court.256  Today, however, 
many courts reject the DOL’s guidance outright.257  In fact, in the recent 
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highly publicized case Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., the Second 
Circuit struck down the lower court’s deference to the DOL’s guidance 
on what constitutes volunteers under the FLSA.258 
But dismissing the DOL’s guidance on the FLSA is an error.  
Congress explicitly stated that the question of what defines “nominal” 
under the FLSA was to be delegated to the DOL in the Committee 
Reports to the 1986 Amendment to the FLSA.259  Thus, any court facing 
ambiguity in the FLSA should look to see if Congress has assigned any 
agency to handle such ambiguity—here, the DOL.  Congress delegated 
this authority without placing conditions on how the DOL would reach 
its guidance, so any artificial creation of those conditions is a bald 
attempt by the courts to make a grab at congressional authority.  Even if 
the Committee Report wasn’t deemed an explicit enough delegation of 
authority, the question should still turn to whether the DOL’s 
interpretation of “nominal” is reasonable and useful in coming to a 
judicial decision.  It is. 
The 20% benchmark the DOL suggests to determine the 
remuneration significance of volunteers is applied to several other areas 
of the FLSA as well.  An employee cannot claim the “tip credit” under 
the FLSA if they spend more than 20% of their workweek doing labor 
that is not “tip credit” approved.260  Employees classified as “domestic 
service” workers may provide companionship to elderly people and 
retain their “domestic service” status provided they spend no more than 
20% of their workweek providing companionship.261  An individual who 
owns more than 20% of a company where he works cannot be classified 
as an employee under the FLSA, but instead as an exempt executive.262  
An employee who spends more than 20% of his workweek engaged in 
non-law-enforcement activities cannot be classified as a law enforcement 
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officer.263  And as noted above, an individual who spends more than 20% 
of his workweek driving makes that activity a significant part of his 
work.264  So, not only did Congress delegate the authority to the DOL to 
define “nominal” under the FLSA, but the DOL has applied that 
definition—the 20-percent test—uniformly. 
Applying this test holistically is also reasonable.  The management 
of emergencies is colloquially known in the fire service as “controlled 
chaos.”265  Within a specific emergency, different responders do very 
different tasks: in a house fire, one may be providing medical care while 
another is inside the structure searching for occupants, while another is 
laying hose from the fire hydrant.  If the courts are to engage in a 
microscopic analysis of compensation per alarm, it opens the door to 
view in isolation the type of work these firefighters were performing on 
each emergency and compare it against the wages for identical work.  
But this misunderstands the reality of how emergency response works: 
the controlled chaos of a scene means that a responder may be doing any 
work he is trained to do. 
The holistic 20-percent test makes much more sense in the 
emergency services context.  Viewing volunteers’ remuneration against 
their full-time counterparts prevents any court’s descent into the 
controlled chaos that defines emergency response.  It more accurately 
reflects the environment of volunteer emergency responders, where the 
actual job is responding to the emergencies—and when a volunteer is not 
running an alarm, they are allowed to return home.  Compare that to 
remaining at the station during the entirety of one’s shift, as is common 
with volunteers’ full-time counterparts.  It also allows departments across 
the country to continue with the same remuneration plans they’ve been 
using without the fear of triggering liability due to uncertain definitions 
of the word “nominal”—or at least it will give those departments a 
bright-line rule to use when evaluating their current remuneration 
arrangements. 
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This holistic 20-percent test, if it had been applied in the wrongly 
decided cases discussed above, would have produced better results.  In 
Mendel, this test would have produced a result in line both with the pay 
of those volunteer firefighters, and in line with the pay of the 
community.266  It would also have provided much more predictable 
results in Pietras.267 Using this test, the court almost certainly would 
have classified Pietras as a volunteer because she received no pay for her 
time, which would have weighed heavily against the court’s holding that 
her retirement and disability benefits were significant.  She also was 
training voluntarily and expected no compensation for her time—and the 
benefits she did receive were commensurate to the type of work she was 
involved in. 
While this holistic 20-percent test is being proposed here for use in 
volunteer emergency services, it would solve many inconsistencies in 
other cases discussed in this comment as well.  In Seattle Opera v. 
NLRB, evaluating the workers’ $2.78 per hour wage—or roughly $5,700 
per year—against the national average268 for an opera chorister’s 
salary—or $62,000 to $125,000 per year269—would have strongly 
favored classifying those workers as volunteers.  If they were public 
employees, considering their voluntary participation and stipend—which 
did not vary based on hours worked—there is no doubt they would have 
been classified as volunteers under the FLSA.  So, this test would solve 
the issue of how a wage in violation of the minimum wage could 
simultaneously be considered significant remuneration. 
E. The DOL’s 20-Percent Test Creates Better Public Policy 
The volunteer emergency services are critical to America’s 
infrastructure.  As noted above, the value they produce by volunteering 
their time amounts to $139.8 billion per year.270  This value is critical to 
America’s infrastructure because it represents more than the federal 
Departments of Education ($68.2 billion), Homeland Security ($41.3 
billion), and Interior ($13.2 billion), and the Environmental Protection 
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 267.   See supra notes 171–78 and accompanying text. 
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Agency ($8.2 billion) spent in 2016 combined.271  Considering America 
was recently given a D+ grade on infrastructure because of lack of 
funding,272 having that $139.8 billion actualized because of bad judicial 
precedent would destroy America’s current funding policy toward 
infrastructure. 
And there is a real fear in the emergency services of Mendel’s 
holding becoming accepted law.  Emergency services organizations and 
litigation firms initially expressed dismay over Mendel and are 
cautiously watching the courts to see if any other circuits adopt similar 
rules about volunteer emergency responders.273 
This caution is almost certainly chilling new recruitment and 
retention strategies, and this hesitation could not come at a worse time.  
The number of volunteer firefighters per 100,000 Americans has 
declined 28% from 1984 to 2003, with no evidence available that those 
numbers have increased since then, and these losses were unforeseen by 
their communities.274  Instead, these were simply positions where new 
volunteer firefighters could not be found to replace the outgoing ones—
forcing their communities to either pay a full-time replacement or leave 
the position vacant.  Unless a course correction can be made, America is 
moving toward paying the $139.8 billion in value volunteer emergency 
responders currently provide. 
Mendel exacerbates the problem of low volunteering numbers, and 
needlessly so.  What communities need is a bright-line rule of what they 
can provide to their potential volunteer responders to incentivize 
recruitment and retention.  And Mendel recognizes a solution to that 
problem—the 20-percent test—but buries it away in a footnote without 
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explaining why it was inapplicable to the case.  But it was applicable to 
the emergency responders in Gibraltar. 
And it is applicable to emergency responders across the United 
States.  The 20-percent test is exactly the bright-line rule that volunteer 
emergency response agencies can understand and rely upon when 
evaluating their proposed recruitment incentives.  This 20-percent test—
applied to other DOL guidelines stating courts should evaluate the total 
payments made275—creates a clear framework for these volunteer 
agencies: do your total financial incentives exceed 20% of what a full-
time equivalent would make?  If so, you have an “employee” under the 
FLSA.  If not, then you need fear no issue on the grounds of whether 
your incentives are “nominal.” 
Such a bright-line rule is important for reasons far more important 
that money.  Every year, emergency medical services respond to over 36 
million calls for help.276  Every year, firefighters respond to over 1.3 
million fires and nearly 1.1 million other hazardous events.277  Without 
proper staffing, millions of Americans won’t get the emergency medical 
care they need, and hundreds of thousands of homes will burn.  And the 
proper staffing in most of the United States involves volunteer 
responders. 
These volunteer responders deserve better than a judicial decree 
informing them they only volunteer in contemplation of pay.278  The 
agencies they work for deserve better than a decision that limits their 
ability to incentivize new recruits without defining clear boundaries.  
And the public deserves better than a judicial decree that has the 
potential to either raise their taxes or lower the level of care they receive 
in their hour of need. 
In short, America deserves better than the holding in Mendel v. City 
of Gibraltar. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Courts should defer to the DOL’s guidance when determining what 
makes a worker a “volunteer” under the FLSA.  Specifically, they should 
follow the DOL’s guidance of what constitutes nominal pay and the 
DOL’s recommendation that any pay received be looked at in its totality.  
These two items of advice, when applied together, create a bright-line 
rule that is the best of both worlds in the emergency services: it protects 
against municipalities taking advantage of their emergency responders by 
giving safeguards that trigger “employee” status under the FLSA, while 
still ensuring those communities can compensate their volunteers without 
fear of litigation. 
And it is important courts adopt this standard.  With volunteerism 
rates declining and jobs leaving small communities, there is a very real 
risk that these communities may be forced to employ full-time 
emergency responders, a financial burden potentially too great for 
already cash-strapped communities.  These small towns and 
municipalities need to be able to compensate their volunteer 
responders—responders who are willing to risk their health and safety 
for their neighbors—without fear of triggering provisions of a federal 
labor law.  Congress understood the importance of exempting these 
volunteers from the FLSA three decades ago, but somehow that’s been 
lost. 
Courts should return to this congressional intent and recognize the 
special place volunteer emergency services responders have in our 
communities.  Following agency deference and accepting the 
Department of Labor’s guidance is a good start towards that goal. 
 
